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a b s t r a c t
Ecosystem service valuation (ESV) attempts to transform the opposition of human economic necessity and
ecological conservation by valuing the latter in terms of the services rendered by the former. However, despite
a number of ESV-inspired sustainability initiatives since the 1990s, global ecological degradation continues to
accelerate. This suggests that ESV has fallen far short of its goals of sustainable social transformation—a failure
which has generated considerable criticism. This paper reviews three prominent lines of ESV criticism: 1) the
neo-Marxist criticism, which emphasizes the “ﬁctitious” character of ecosystem commodities; 2) the liberal
criticism through Friedrich Hayek's concept “scientistic objectivism”; and 3) the pragmatist criticism of “value
monism”. Although each form of criticism provides insight into the limitations of ESV, all share ESV's inability
to discern what kind of social transformation is possible. Unable to provide an account of their own immersion
in social and historical context, these approaches operate in the hypothetical. In light of these shortcomings,
this paper advances a critical theory approach, which we contend provides conceptual tools uniquely
well-suited to more adequately address the question of social transformation.
© 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. The Hypothetical Character of Ecosystem Service Valuation (ESV)
Increasingly the conservation of ecosystems is justiﬁed on the basis
of the economic value of the human welfare these ecosystems support.
Since many of the “services” supplied by ecosystems (e.g. carbon
sequestration, water puriﬁcation, habitat for insects pollinating nearby
crops) are not currently captured in markets, advocates of Ecosystem
Service Valuation (ESV hereafter) hope to revitalize conservation efforts
by calculating and revealing the associated and hidden welfare beneﬁts
(e.g. Armsworth et al., 2007; Costanza, 1996; Daily, 1997; Liu et al.,
2010; MEA, 2005).
At the same time, ESV has been unable to address the intricate interrelationship between social-structure and ecology. While the majority
⁎ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: Andony.Melathopoulos@dal.ca (A.P. Melathopoulos).
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of ecosystems that contribute to human well-being are currently
being degraded, much of this degradation has accelerated throughout
the latter half of the twentieth century (MEA, 2005)—precisely the period
in which ESV developed. This includes the 1980–1990s, a period that
Gómez-Baggethun and Ruiz-Pérez (2011) suggest gave rise to myriad
of market-based environmental protection initiatives; the immediate
precursors of ESV. Yet, many of the initiatives from this period
(e.g. managing externalities of pollution through tradable allowances
(Newell et al., 2013; Stavins and Schmalensee, 2012), wetland mitigation banking (Robertson, 2006) or promoting local economic development as a means to slow biodiversity loss (Ghazoul, 2007; Muradian
et al., 2013)) have fallen far short of their anticipated goals.
ESV initiatives developed in the last decade have fared no better. The
ﬁrst international wave of these initiatives, the Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment (MEA, 2005) and The Economics of Ecosystems and
Biodiversity (TEEB) (2007), coincided with the failure to meet the
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Millennium global targets on biodiversity (2000–2010) (Butchart et al.,
2010). Expectations are high that the accumulation of research, theoretical approaches and practical experience with ESV will ﬁnally coalesce
under the Intergovernmental Panel on Biodiversity and Ecosystem
Services (IPBES) (Cardinale et al., 2012; Perrings et al., 2011, 2010).
This assessment, however, presupposes that the prior limitations of
ESV were technical in nature and that future limitations can be resolved
by simply more research, theory and operationalization (e.g. Daily,
2000; Daily et al., 2009; Kinzig et al., 2011; Kremen, 2005; Kremen
and Ostfeld, 2005).
Such a narrow focus on technical and operational shortcomings
is indicative of what we will refer to as ESV's hypothetical character.
The focus on technical progress, we contend, is not incidental, but
emerges from an assumed distance from the social–historical context
that generates ecological deterioration. ESV, then, operates in the hypothetical insofar as it presupposes a separation between itself and the
social–historical context within which its activity takes place. Indeed,
ESV advocates are able to think of themselves as making progress, despite their own prognosis that ecological systems are being degraded,
because they assume an Archimedean standpoint outside of the
ecologically destructive dimensions of society. It is by virtue of this
decontextualization that ESV advocates are able to perpetuate the assertion that more and better market valuations of “ecosystem services” will
overcome past failures, in spite of any evidence of efﬁcacy (Laurans
et al., 2013). However, ESV fails to provide an adequate account of ecological degradation (much less a feasible strategy towards sustainability) because its practitioners are unable to grasp how their activity is
mediated by a social–historical context deeply connected to patterns of
ecological degradation. The ESV approach is hypothetical because it
lacks the means of discerning how the constitutional logic of modern
capitalist society might inhibit: 1) efforts to illuminate this structure
and 2) collective efforts to deal with pressing social problems, such as
global climate change, in an effective manner (i.e. in a manner that
does not regenerate the problem itself in a different form) (Dahms,
2008: 14–15).
Likewise, scholars examining the continual degradation of global
ecological systems have not yet fully recognized the social and historical
context through which such degradation takes place. Amid historically
unprecedented levels of political–economic global interconnectivity
following the end of the Second World War (see, e.g., McNeill, 2000),
the acceleration of ecological degradation throughout the latter half of
the twentieth century appears paradoxical: In the post-WWII era,
degradation is compounded in proportion to our awareness of these
problems (Blühdorn, 2013; Stoner, 2014; Stoner and Melathopoulos,
2015). Following Stoner (2014), we refer to the paradox of increasing
ecological degradation amid growing environmental attention and
concern as the environment–society problematic. Unable to discern
this paradoxical historical development, the normative aim of ESV
(i.e., sustainability) is not borne out in practice and remains hypothetical.
The rising tide of ESV—far from indicating an increasing capacity to
shape our future towards less ecologically-destructive ends—actually
signals a growing inability to shape (let alone understand) the socialhistorical context that is generative of such runaway ecological
degradation.
This is not to suggest that the limitations of ESV have gone unnoticed. Criticisms have mounted with recognition that ESV coincides
with the deterioration of key biophysical indicators. Chief among
these are 1) neo-Marxist; 2) liberal; and 3) pragmatist lines of ESV
criticism.1 Although these three lines of criticism represent the most
signiﬁcant attempts to understand the limitations of ESV to date, none

1
For the sake of brevity and clarity, we will select authors whose works we believe offer
exemplars of each approach, though we certainly recognize that these scholars may or
may not self-identify with the labels (neo-Marxist, liberal, and/or pragmatist) we ascribe
to them.

are able to make historical sense out of the growing popularity of the
ecosystem service approach itself. As we endeavor to demonstrate,
this is in large part because the theories underlying each criticism are
also unable to grasp their own immersion in society and history. In
this way, critics are only able to consider ESV as either “wrong thinking”
or determined by agents that somehow stand outside or above society
(e.g., market environmentalists, ecological technocrats, hardened ideologues). Consequently, like ESV, the criticisms are restricted to reacting
to social transformations, passively describing these changes, but never
being able to regard them reﬂexively — never attaining the level of a
theory about how society could potentially change. In other words,
both ESV and its criticisms fail to recognize the potential for society to
change because neither can grasp the deeper causes of social discontents
(e.g., discontents to which an ecologist who calculates ESV or those who
promote their estimates are ultimately responding to) or the ways in
which such discontents are integrated back into the structuring
logic of modern capitalist society, thereby allowing long-standing
socio-ecological problems to be perpetuated.
This paper engages in an immanent critique of the neo-Marxist,
liberal, and pragmatist attempts to understand the limitations of ESV in
order to illuminate the historical speciﬁcity of our current inability to
locate a social basis for ecosystem conservation. Our immanent critique
reveals how, in opposing ESV, these criticisms reproduce its most problematic feature: environmental degradation is decontextualized and, as
a result, sustainability remains hypothetical. Against this background,
we outline two key methodological motifs of a critical theory approach,
which we contend provides conceptual tools that are uniquely wellsuited to more fully comprehend the links between economic progress
and ecological deterioration and the discontents this generates.

2. The Criticism of Ecosystem Service Valuation (ESV)
2.1. The Neo-Marxist Criticism: Ecosystem Services as Commodities
The neo-Marxist line of criticism (exempliﬁed by Kallis et al., 2013;
Kosoy and Corbera, 2010; Peterson et al., 2010; Robertson, 2012,
2000) argues that ESV fails because the process of abstracting commodities (i.e., services) from ecosystem functions obscures the complicated
interconnections within ecosystems and between society and ecosystems, leaving us to mistakenly “think that capital grapples directly
with material nature” (Robertson, 2012: 396). Moreover, the abstraction of value from ecosystems undermines the potential awareness of
these interconnections because consumers, land managers, ecologists
and others become ﬁxated on ecosystem values in the market, a process
Kosoy and Corbera (2010) liken to the worship of a fetish object in
pre-modern societies. Kosoy and Corbera's reference to this fetish-like
reverence of ecosystem value, like all neo-Marxist criticisms of ESV,
draws on Marx's analysis of commodities in Capital Vol. 1, speciﬁcally
the ﬁnal section of Chapter 1 titled “The Fetish of the Commodity and
Its Secret” (Marx (1976 [1867]): 163–177). The criticism, in turn, rests
on a careful analysis of the social and ecological implications associated
with each of the stages in transforming ecosystems into a commodity
that can “bear value” (Robertson, 2012: 388)—that is, the itemization,
characterization and spatial mapping of ecosystem functions, their recategorization as ecosystem services and their packaging or bundling
into tradable commodities.
According to the neo-Marxist criticism, the signiﬁcance of this
technical process in creating “a more and more differentiated realm
for the circulation of capital” (Kosoy and Corbera, 2010: 1231) is in
stark contrast to ESV advocates, who view the process of technical innovation as key to resolving ESV shortcomings. Indeed, the neo-Marxist
criticism provides a compelling account for why technical solutions
appear efﬁcacious to ESV practitioners. By structuring the way society
understands its relationship to ecosystems – in terms of “services”
that “bear economic value” – the deﬁnition and speciﬁcation of those
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services only appears to be a path leading to sustainability; while in
actuality, this path leads to the destruction of ecosystems:
“Bracketing nature as ‘material’ or as an unmediated force in capitalist accumulation prevents us from discerning the struggle over the
creation of value bearing abstractions from its materiality (…) In
dealing with nature, we are always attended by the invitation to
mistake the ordering of appearances for order itself, to mistake the
difﬁculties of classifying and categorising nature for the intransigence of nature itself.” (Robertson, 2012: 397)
On this basis, the neo-Marxist criticism purports to explain a number
of problematic aspects of contemporary ESV practices, including:
a) how the overwhelming demand for some services (e.g. carbon sequestration) leads to the degradation of other associated ecosystem
functions (e.g. reforestation with fast growing trees reduces biodiversity
and soil retention) (Kosoy and Corbera, 2010; Peterson et al., 2010) and
b) why diverse social and cultural values associated with ecosystems
have become less relevant to the assessment of ecosystem value, paving
the way for highly asymmetrical power structures for rendering
management decisions (Kallis et al., 2013; Kosoy and Corbera, 2010).
Moreover, by grounding the emergence of ESV in the rise (1980s–
present) of “market environmentalism” (Kosoy and Corbera, 2010) or
“neoliberalism” (Kallis et al., 2013; Peterson et al., 2010; Robertson,
2012, 2006) the criticism c) provides an explanation of why ESV has
been accompanied by an upward redistribution of wealth.
The neo-Marxist criticism views the fetish character of putting monetary values on ecosystems as synonymous with the idea that valuation
constitutes “commodity ﬁction”. The idea of a “commodity ﬁction”,
however, does not arise from Marx, but from the thought of Polanyi
(2001 [1944]), whose historical sociology sought to ground the underlying dynamic of modern society in the commodiﬁcation of three things
that supposedly cannot be commodities, namely land, labor and money.
According to the neo-Marxist criticism, the ﬁrst of Polanyi's ﬁctitious
commodities (land) can be broadly reinterpreted to encompass ecosystems. Polanyi maintained that any attempt to render these dimension of
life as commodities results in a resisting social counter-movement that
sets up an oscillating historical dynamic between advancing markets
and restricting these markets through public control. Consequently,
rather than any form of social transformation, these authors look to a
broadly-constituted resistance against commodiﬁcation.
The recourse to resistance, however, misses a key dimension
through which social discontents of the 1970s not only failed to reduce
ecosystem degradation, but also reproduced capitalism in a new form.
While neo-Marxist authors acknowledge that market-oriented utilitarian approaches to environmental and resource management gained
popularity just as global neoliberal capitalism was emerging in the
1970s, they attribute this development to forces outside of society. According to the neo-Marxist criticism, the synchronicity of neoliberalism
and the growing popularity of utilitarian approaches to the environment during the 1970s involved expanding the scope of markets to incorporate dimensions of life considered public goods or common pool
resources. This, in turn, rolled back the scale and scope of national
environmental legislation and regulatory agencies, which had been
tasked with protecting these resources beginning in early decades of
the twentieth century (Peterson et al., 2010). Neo-Marxists typically interpret the declining role of the state in regulating society's relationship
to ecosystems as paving the way for a new round of capital accumulation following the global political and economic crises of the 1970s
(Kallis et al., 2013; Kosoy and Corbera, 2010; Peterson et al., 2010;
Robertson, 2012, 2000).
The advance of “market environmentalism” and the subsequent
appeal of ESV, however, cannot be fully explained with reference to
the rolling back of the state-centered conservation framework
“from above” (Heynen et al., 2007; McCarthy and Prudham, 2004).
Unlike the 1960s, the 1980s witnessed growing public fatigue with
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environmental issues, which was combined with a sense of the insufﬁciency of environmental regulation (the “implementation deﬁcit”,
Røpke, 2005: 268). That is to say, popular discontent was an important
part of the socio-historical context that gave rise to “market
environmentalism”—the seeming opposite of Polanyi's prediction that
social counter-movements push in the direction of restricting markets
and placing them under public control. Rather than attempt to grasp
the basis of this regulatory roll-back in terms of social mediation
(an approach we develop below in our discussion of critical theory
below—Section 3), the neo-Marxist criticism relies on the unwarranted
assumption that popular discontents (e.g. contemporary environmentalism) stand outside the social structure of capitalism. Such a perspective fails to adequately account for how capitalism itself is transformed
(e.g., from its regulatory state form to one in which regulation is rolled
back) in and through popular discontents (e.g., 1960s discontents
with industrial pollution results in the expansion of state regulation in
the 1970s and the disappointment with these regulations, coupled
with unease from a severe economic downturn, contributes to their
undoing in the 1980s).
What is entirely overlooked by these critics is that Marx's “economic”
categories—value, commodity, capital, labor, surplus value—are not solely economic, but rather forms of social being speciﬁc to the capitalist
mode of production (Postone, 1993). As Postone (2007: 16) observes,
“Polanyi's insistence on the ﬁctitious character of labor, land, and
money as commodities obscures Marx's analysis of the commodity as a
form of social relations”. In other words, in contrast to Polanyi, commodity for Marx is not a matter of an underlying social, cultural or ecological
foundation made obscure to itself by the “ﬁction” of exchange. Instead,
the peculiar form of social objectivity and subjectivity characteristic of
capitalist societies is mediated through the commodity form and must
be understood as such. Furthermore, for Marx, the contradictory
character of commodities (i.e., how they appear concrete and natural
as well as abstract and “ﬁctional”) cannot be separated from the historically unprecedented social dynamic (i.e. capital) in which his theory
takes root. From this perspective, history is not driven by forces outside
society — there is no “natural” ground for discerning a “real” from a
“ﬁctitious” commodity, only the changing form of modern society itself.
Although Robertson (2012: 396) comes close to recognizing the distinctly social character of commodities when he states that the necessity
for resistance “does not arise from the point at which intransigent
nature expresses its material character, but rather at the point at
which we (…) retract our consent to the adequacy of social abstractions
as bearers of value”, this insight is conﬁned to his Polanyian approach.
For Robertson grounds agency in the reaction against the commodity
form rather than attempting to recognize the possibility for further
transformation lying within it. For Marx, on the other hand, the
conscious transformation of society—e.g., towards less ecologically
destructive ends—requires critically recognizing social context as that
which renders possible new (and more adequate) forms of thought
and activity.
2.2. The Liberal Criticism: Ecosystem Services as “Scientistic Objectivism”
Unlike the neo-Marxist line of criticism, the liberal criticism does not
contend that markets obscure social and ecological reality. According to
the liberal criticism, exempliﬁed by the prominent environmental
philosopher Mark Sagoff, the “ﬁction” of ESV exists precisely to the
extent that ecosystem service values are taken to be as an objective
measure of social welfare when in fact they represent the narrow
interests of environmentalists. Although taken from this perspective
neo-Marxist and liberal criticisms of ESV appear to have little in common, both regard ESV as being imposed on society from “above”
(i.e., by “market environmentalists” for neo-Marxists and by ecological
economists for liberals). They differ only in how they conceptualize
society; neo-Marxists (following Polanyi) understand society in
collectivist terms (i.e., society is constituted by shared social values,
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particularly among poor and marginalized strata of society) and liberals
in terms of the individual (i.e., self-interested individuals generate a
social whole that is more than the sum of its parts).
In this section we demonstrate that the collectivist/regulatory state
that emerged in the 1930s was not eliminated in the 1980s, as liberals
had hoped, but transformed such that collectivist and individualist
features of societies became deeply integrated. We develop this proposition through the concrete example of a well-studied ecosystem
service, the insect pollination of agricultural crops, and show how
valuations enabled conservation to be integrated into state-regulation
of agricultural markets through agri-environmental initiatives. Integration, however, progressed in-step with the “liberalization” of agriculture
in the 1990s, which demonstrates how the liberal criticism cannot be
readily separated from its social context. We conclude that the liberal
criticism of ESV is hypothetical because, like ESV, it merely reﬂects
(and perpetuates) the social context that is generative not only of ESV
and ecological degradation, but the growing illiberal character of society
more generally.
The liberal criticism of ESV draws on Friedrich Hayek's (1899–1992)
formulation of “scientistic objectivism”, which he developed in a series
of essays written during the Second World War (Hayek, 1942, 1943,
1944). Hayek develops the term “scientistic” (and “scientism”) to
describe a form of rational planning in the 1930s that was informed
by “objective” laws derived by “impartial” specialists who assume a
perspective above society. Such planning purported to act in the name
of an objectivity previously accorded only to the physical sciences. But
the parallel between Science and “scientism”, Hayek asserts, is illusory.
“Scientism”, for him, is but the “slavish imitation of the method and
language of science” (Hayek, 1942: 269) and its “objectivity” contributes
“scarcely anything to our understanding of social phenomena” (Hayek,
1942: 268).
Take, for example, the case of pollination mentioned previously.
Liberal critics claim that while pollination ecologists employ Science to
classify patterns of wild bee pollinator biodiversity, they cross over
into “scientism” when they extend their “objectivity” into claims of
the social welfare beneﬁts for conserving wild bee habitat. It is one
thing, the critics suggest, to maintain that bee biodiversity is linked to
patterns of uncultivated land-use around agricultural crops, or that the
yield of these crops increases in relation to the dynamic and interacting
character of this biodiversity (Luck et al., 2009: 228), but it is another to
assert that preserving bee habitat is the only avenue available for
farmers to increase their proﬁts (Sagoff, 2011). In other words, pollination ecologists engage “scientism” when they extend their objective
ecological ﬁndings to questions of social necessity.
“Scientistic objectivism” enables liberal critics to account for a
key shortcoming of ESV—the “environmentalist's paradox” whereby
human wellbeing appears unconnected to the degradation of ecosystems (Raudsepp-Hearne et al., 2010). Extending the pollination example, the paradox can be expressed as follows: In the face of large and
growing estimates of ESV by pollination ecologists (Calderone, 2012;
Gallai et al., 2009; Lautenbach et al., 2012), the explosive growth of
pollinator-dependent crop output since the 1990s (Aizen et al., 2009)
and the relatively slow growth of insect pollinator supply (Aizen and
Harder, 2009; Breeze et al., 2011, 2014; Schulp et al., 2014), why do
farmers growing pollinator-dependent crops fail to make investments
in conserving pollinator habitat (Ghazoul, 2007; Hanes et al., 2013;
Melathopoulos et al., 2015)? The liberal critic dissolves this paradox
by asserting that production increases with declining pollinator service
ﬂow because growers manage pollen limitation dynamically. Growers
do more than adjust inputs and adopt new technologies (Boreux et al.,
2013; Lundin et al., 2013; Melathopoulos et al., 2014), they also seek
to control pollen limitation in relation to society as a whole by managing
the constant interaction of economic variables: “the elements, components, or units of ecosystems relevant to valuation are determined by
and through the economic activity that surrounds them” (Sagoff,
2011: 501). According to the liberal criticism, the “environmentalist's

paradox” only appears to ecologists because in bracketing the activity
of many independent actors working within a socially dynamic system,
pollinator conservation is equated with static “ecological constants”,
derived from seemingly “objective” biophysical laws within which
growers are expected to conform (e.g., patterns of bee biodiversity
across landscapes and their effect on crop yield (Luck et al., 2009)).
Growers do not spend money on pollinator habitat restoration, according to liberal critics, because they are not sound investments. Where
pollination exists as a problem, they engage in local and informal
negotiations to resolve unpaid externalities: “ecosystem services as a
general rule already receive more or less appropriate quantiﬁcation
and pricing either explicitly in market exchange or implicitly in the
Coasian bargaining that arises in the penumbra of markets and in the
shadow of common law” (Sagoff, 2011: 500). Yet, such a characterization of agricultural markets operating in free and open competition
does not withstand scrutiny.
Unlike other sectors of the economy, gains in agricultural productivity are rapidly lost to low prices (Timmer, 2009). The chronic tendency
of agriculture towards oversupply has plagued the farm sector through
most of the twentieth century and only episodically resulted in short
periods of high proﬁts (e.g., 1973–1980 and 2006–2011) (Timmer,
2010), resulting in uneven income distribution between agricultural
and non-agricultural sectors (Timmer, 2009: 30–34) and social
pressures that emerge from the growing disparity between rural and
urban incomes. Pollock (1990 [1941]) would characterize the pattern
for resolving these pressures in the early twentieth century as “state
capitalist”, in which markets became deeply integrated into the state.
As Pollock notes, this trend extended not only to totalitarian countries
(e.g., Germany and the Soviet Union, as Hayek (2006 [1944]) notes)
but also to democratically-governed countries (e.g., the U.S. following
the New Deal). The management of agricultural prices through various
forms of subsidization (e.g., import tariffs, supply management
programs, payments for removing land from production, and direct
payments), following the ﬁrst major collapse of the newly constituted
global market for grain in 1921 is exemplary of this integration
(Friedmann, 1982, 1993).
This pattern of integrating agricultural markets into the state has
accelerated in recent decades, in a way that increasingly comes to bear
on the management of ecosystems. Farm income support programs
were themselves drawn into a deep crisis in the mid-1970s along with
many other features of the post-WWII political and economic order.
As governments in industrialized countries attempted to restructure
their economies by reducing government expenditures and promoting
global trade liberalization, farm income programs became increasingly
difﬁcult to justify to a primarily urbanized tax base already facing
deep cuts to their own state welfare beneﬁts (Potter, 1998, 2009).
Signiﬁcantly, the ﬁrst valuations of insect pollination services emerged
in this period as an explicit means by which the U.S. beekeeping sector
justiﬁed its price support program in the face of mounting public
scrutiny (Muth and Thurman, 1995; Robinson et al., 1989).
Yet, attempts to liberalize agriculture in the 1990s failed and the
agricultural sectors in the U.S. and E.U. remain highly regulated and subsidized (Timmer, 2009). As Friedmann (1993: 29) correctly anticipated,
“the choice is not between ‘regulation’ or ‘free trade’ (…) but between
new forms of implicit or explicit regulation”. Consequently, while liberal
criticisms of ESV presuppose liberalization—that agricultural ﬁrms directly and immediately interact with one another (and with surrounding ecosystems)—they ultimately miss how the relationship between
agricultural ﬁrms and ecosystems are actually mediated through social
structures (e.g., through state-regulated price control programs)
designed to cope with the internal contradictions of capitalism
(e.g., the chronic tendency of agriculture towards oversupply). In
doing so, liberals not only miss how farm sector lobbyists joined
ecologists in advancing their interests using valuations, but also the
way in which their interests became increasingly integrated through
state-led agri-environmental schemes starting in the 1990s (Potter,
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1998). Today, a major source of agricultural price support comes in
the form of state-legislated biofuel blending standards in the U.S.
(beginning in 2007) and by E.U. members states (2003) that are justiﬁed politically in terms of increasing carbon sequestration ecosystem
services (Gerasimchuk and Koh, 2013; Tyner, 2008).
Since the sectional interests of farm groups appear better able to
control the terms of agri-environmental policies, they are typically accompanied by weak provisions for evaluating conservation outcomes
(Kleijn et al., 2011). Yet, in the face of deep cuts in state expenditures
after the 2008 global economic crisis, ecologists and conservationists
fear that even the meager conservation provisions within existing
agri-environmental programs will be disproportionately weakened
(Pe'er et al., 2014; Potter, 2009). In this sense ESV may not so much be
“scientistic” (i.e., advancing an abstract image of how society and
ecosystems ought to interact from above) as imitating what they
correctly deem as the successful rent-seeking strategies coming from
below (e.g., those used by farm lobbyists competitors) in light of an
illiberal social context.
The liberal criticism operates in the hypothetical because it is unable
to locate the illiberal features of society in society, but instead attributes
them to a largely exogenous force (i.e., ESV) and asserts society is otherwise liberal (i.e., governed by common law and constituted by markets).
But as we have argued, the growth of ESV reﬂects a growing integration
between conservation and new forms of “implicit” regulation that have
advanced alongside “liberalization” (i.e., the dismantling of “explicitly”
regulated markets) since the 1990s. Although this enables liberal
critics to describe many of the problems associated with ESV it is unable
to grasp ESV as symptomatic of a deeper social dynamic. This
dynamic—typiﬁed by the chronic tendency of agriculture towards
oversupply and the perpetual return of regulation—assumes a quasiobjective predictable form, which farmers, conservationists and liberal
critics are all subject to. Unable to recognize itself as reﬂecting this dynamic, the liberal criticism of ESV becomes a way of perpetuating it
along with all its contradictions.
2.3. The Pragmatist Criticism: Ecosystem Services as “Value Monism”
The pragmatist line of criticism is exempliﬁed by the work of the environmental philosopher Bryan Norton, who draws together American
pragmatist philosophy with the thought of the early twentieth century
conservationist Aldo Leopold. Whereas neo-Marxists reject the objectivity of ESV on ontological grounds (“ﬁctitious commodities”), and liberals reject ESV as the attempt to undermine the legitimacy of liberal
society; pragmatists reject ESV to the extent that it precludes “a more
profound reexamination of how one might create a rational process of
policy evaluation that truly takes into account both economic and
ecological impacts of our decisions” (Norton and Noonan, 2007: 665).
Pragmatists attempt a deep reconsideration of society's relation to
ecosystems through a process of rational deliberation (Norton, 2005:
51–56). In this sense, the pragmatist and liberal criticisms bear some resemblance to one another. The difference between the two approaches
revolves around their respective assessments of the bitter debates over
ecosystem management that characterized the twentieth century.
While liberals look to the “moral fervor” of these debates as a progressive social force (Sagoff, 2012), pragmatists view the opposing poles of
these debates as being hardened and unresponsive to changes in
ecosystems, communities and values. The pragmatist criticism of ESV
is distinct in its anticipation of the possibility for a more constructive
and open-ended approach to relating ecosystems to society, one that
that provides: “room for ﬂexibility and for learning from experience”
(Norton, 2005: 56).
Pragmatists criticize ESV for assuming that social welfare can be
captured through a single dimension—namely, the quantitative and
objective measure of individual consumer preferences (Norton and
Noonan, 2007). Yet, in practice, the attempt to render the functional
complexity of ecosystems, as well as the public and future interests
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people ascribe to them, into monetary units demands considerable theoretical abstraction. Paradoxically, such abstraction means relaxing the
very neoclassical economic principles of utility ESV looks to employ.
Consequently, ecologists who attempt to motivate social demands for
conservation by emphasizing the economic beneﬁts of protecting
ecosystems face what Norton and Noonan (2007: 668–669) term “the
ecologists' dilemma”; they either must restrict the scope of beneﬁts
generated by ecosystems in order to ﬁt within the marginal utility
framework, or stretch the deﬁnition of utility to a point where it is no
longer is recognizable as economic value.
While the “ecologists' dilemma” poses a seemingly insoluble tradeoff to ecological economists, Norton and Noonan (2007) suggest this is
only the case to the extent that they insist that welfare beneﬁts be
expressed in terms of a single “objective” dimension of value. Moreover,
they assert that breaking with this reductionist approach, which they
term “value monism”, is a matter of choice:
“if we recognize that the decision to model ecological values in the
economic framework is a choice among multiple possible metaphors
and models, then the decision as to what is important to measure
rests on a value judgment” (Norton and Noonan, 2007: 670).
The choice against valuation is a process of communicative action
known as adaptive management. Drawing on Pickett and Cadenasso
(2002), who emphasize the role of metaphors in generating scientiﬁc
models of ecosystems and in mediating societal values towards ecological systems, Norton and Noonan envision adaptive management as
foregrounding these value-laden metaphors, using them consciously
in an iterative, experimental and deliberative process. Here ecosystem
service value is re-conceptualized not as an impartial form of objectivity
but as one metaphor among many—Norton and Noonan characterize
ESV as a metaphor for “ecosystems as a welfare producing machine”
(2007: 655)—whose adequacy can be judged not on its own basis
(monism) but on its capacity, in relation to other metaphors, to match
a constellation of social values with the dynamic and complex processes
of ecological systems (pluralism).
The pragmatist criticism is potentially signiﬁcant for locating the
constraints to conscious social transformation in a form of instrumental
rationality that gives rise to value monism, and the possibility that intersubjective deliberation might dissolve the hardened ideologies that
perpetuate monistic approaches. However, pragmatists cut short these
insights by not reﬂecting on the grounds of their own thought. The unwavering commitment to communicative action, for example, assumes
subjective values (e.g., the different ways people value wild pollinators)
exist independently of objective constraints (e.g., the chronic tendency
of agriculture towards oversupply—Section 2.2). As such, the pragmatist
criticism is ill-equipped to meet the concerns raised by neo-Marxists,
whereby the experience of an ecosystem—and by extension one's
value of it—is mediated through being considered as a commodity
(i.e., “a welfare producing machine”). By extension, the pragmatist emphasis on the autonomy of social values fails to address a key characteristic of the present ecological crisis; if social values offer a path to
sustainability how can this be reconciled with the fact of that proliferation of environmental awareness (i.e., environmental values) fails to
bring about sustainable practices (Blühdorn, 2013; Stoner, 2014)?
These shortcomings highlight the limitations of deﬁning the environment–society problematic (Section 1) in communicative terms
alone. Pragmatism's emphasis on deliberative action falls short insofar
as it recasts the classical epistemological subject–object relation in intersubjective and linguistic terms (Nelson, 2011). Signiﬁcantly, the
pragmatist criticism has paid less attention to the elusive processes of
social mediation, which we return to elaborate below. The separation
of subjective values from objective social structure therefore risks sinking into a “self-imposed abstractness” whenever pragmatists attempt to
relate their theory to actual practices (Norton, 2005: 389). Not surprisingly, the promise of social transformation, which attended the
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communicative shift (see Habermas, 1983 [1981]) during the late 1970s
and early 1980s, has failed. Indeed, there is an elective afﬁnity between
this failure, on the one hand, and the demand for politics, which has yet
to be met. In fact, the increasing demand for social transformation
(i.e., the desire for an ecologically “sustainable” society), expressed
through the pragmatist proposals for adaptive management—far
from facilitating effective communication—may even function to
“disperse political responsibility and obscure chains of accountability”
(Blühdorn, 2013: 31). In this way, adaptive management may conceal
underlying powerlessness through a process that appears as its opposite
(i.e., conscious and rational deliberation over ecosystem management).
This vulnerability arises from the fact that most adaptive management
initiatives claim successful outcomes without adequate implementation
studies, leading to unsubstantiated claims that the approach can be
readily scaled up to highly complex and large-scale socio-ecological
problems (e.g. climate change) (Rist et al., 2013). The interplay between
concern for ecological degradation and the uncertain operational parameter of adaptive managements results in what Sagoff (2008: 86)
characterizes as an “academic blessing” for entrenched positions that
“institutionalize paralysis by analysis and (…) guarantee indecision
over the long run”. The growing concern around ecosystem degradation
that characterizes the environmental-society problematic ﬁnds its full
expression in adaptive management. That is to say, adaptive management meets the demand for transformation without, however, having
to deliver outcomes. Ironically, this feature of adaptive management
does not differentiate it from ESV, but parallels it (Laurans et al., 2013).
3. Methodology of Critique
In this paper we have shown how, in criticizing the shortcomings of
ESV, neo-Marxist, liberal and pragmatist approaches take a standpoint
outside their socio-historical context. As a result, these approaches are
unable to address the central question underlying the issue of
sustainability—namely, what kind of context might generate the type
of transformation that could overcome the opposition of social necessity
and ecosystem integrity? Both ESV and its critics proceed without
asking what kind of transformation is historically possible; and in this
sense, they operate in the hypothetical. Notwithstanding their differences, the neo-Marxist, pragmatist, and liberal critics of ecosystem
valuation remain a reﬂection of socio-historical context rather than a
critical reﬂection on socio-historical context (Dahms, 2008). Unable to
grasp their immersion in within the socio-historical context that generates ESV, these critics perpetuate a “sustainability gap” (Fischer et al.,
2007) by recourse to nostalgia for past and failed political mediations
(liberal), schemes for idealized deliberative spaces (pragmatists), and/
or the frustrated call for “resistance” (neo-Marxist).
In light of these shortcomings, this section outlines key aspects of a
critical theory approach, which we contend provides conceptual tools
uniquely well-suited to more adequately address the question of social
transformation. Because an adequate elaboration of critical theory is
well beyond the scope of this article, the following focuses on two
methodological motifs—immanent critique and mediation.
3.1. Immanent Critique
As Kuhn's (1996[1962]) famous scientiﬁc revolution thesis makes
clear, understanding scientiﬁc change and development is impossible
without an acute comprehension of the signiﬁcance of historical events
and situations in shaping the activity of science. This basic insight is particularly relevant to critical theory, which must be situated in relation to
its context—that is, modern capitalist society. Accordingly, one of the
central aims of critical theory is to recognize and make explicit how,
in an integrated capitalist society, it is impossible to think outside of
our societal context. Even thoughts and phenomena which appear
transhistorical, such as land, human labor, political legitimacy and
human communication, always take place within a given context.

Critical theory seeks to go beyond mere historicity (i.e., the past as an accumulation of facts and events) in order take into account how thought
itself is historically constituted. Such a critical and reﬂexive approach
can be traced back to G.W.F. Hegel (1770–1831), whose philosophical
system was premised on the recognition that ideas about reality are historically situated. Later critical theorist such as Herbert Marcuse, Max
Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, and others associated with the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research in the 1930s, 40s, and 50s questioned
the notion that researchers can separate themselves from the phenomena and societies they study. The Frankfurt School critical theorists resuscitated the critical impetus of Hegelian-Marxist social theory—an
approach they saw as being commensurate with their commitment to
social emancipation, particularly in the wake of the German Weimer
Republic (1919–1933). In doing so, the Frankfurt School critical theorists
sought to specify how ideas such as progress were legitimized through
unquestioned authority in a repressive and administered world.
Max Horkheimer laid the groundwork for a methodological approach capable of taking into account the idea that knowledge claims
are constrained by the reality perceived in his distinction between
traditional theory, on the one hand, and critical theory, on the other
(Horkheimer, 1972 [1937]). According to Horkheimer, the social–
historical “object” of analysis—namely, modern capitalist society—is in
no way separate from the social–historical reality of the researcher's milieu, which in turn deﬁnes the reality perceived (Horkheimer, 1972
[1937]). Traditional theory, by contrast, ignores the dualisms between
thought and being, on the one hand, and understanding and perception,
on the other. Severed from its social–historical context, traditional theory views scientiﬁc activity taking place alongside all other activities in
society, “but in no immediately clear connection with them” (Horkheimer,
1972 [1937]: 197 [emphases added]). Theory must, then, be “critical”
enough to account for its immersion in history. Theory, rather than
being considered exogenous, must be recognized as an integral part of
capitalist society. Critical theory is thus confronted with the twofold
task of critique and transformation. Such an approach must provide a
critique of its own social–historical context—and it must do so in a
radically immanent manner, so as to specify the nature of historical
development which must be confronted and overcome (Leiss, 2011)
in any attempt to effect sustainable transformation. We contend that a
critical theory geared towards sustainability must, at the very least,
provide a critical and reﬂexive account of:
1) The conditions of its own possibility (i.e. social context); and
2) The immanent possibility of the fundamental transformation of this
context (i.e., the notion that social context itself is generative of its
own supersession).
Critical theory meets this twofold challenge of critique and transformation by engaging a methodology known as immanent critique. To
begin, the critical theorist must explain how it is possible to critique
capitalism while being a part of capitalism. That the structures and
underlying social relations of modern society are contradictory is what
generates the possibility of a critical stance towards this context
(Postone, 1993: 88). Take, for example, the chronic tendency of agriculture towards oversupply discussed in Section 2.2. The independent
activity of freely contracting agricultural ﬁrms rapidly increases agricultural output, which in turn, undermines prices leading (in the twentieth
century) to decades of low proﬁtability. The discontents associated with
this social dynamic are manifold and are not simply associated with the
income gap that opens between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors of society. Attempts to regulate this dynamic in industrial countries
(e.g., by subsidizing farmers) frequently resulted in increased productivity (i.e., through machinery and agro-chemicals) (Friedmann, 1993;
Potter, 1998) that generated new discontents (e.g., environmentalist
and consumer responses to the “industrialization” of agriculture,
increased costs of farm programs and the backlash by the urban tax
base, etc.).
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As explained previously, according to Marx's theory, capital, as the
structuring principle of underlying social relations, both generates and
prevents the possibility of its own supersession. Critical theory's
referent of critique, although generated within capitalist society, points
outside existing social conditions. In other words, critique's conditions
of possibility are socially constituted by the dynamic and contradictory
nature of capital itself. For example, the environmentalist ideal of having
enough, as opposed to having more, is a real possibility generated by the
enormous wealth-producing capacity of industrial capital. But capitalism, as a system of social organization premised on producing more
and more ad inﬁnitum, simultaneously undermines the possibility that
such an ideal will become actual. This contradiction between immanence and transcendence is what normatively compels and analytically
enables critical theory to develop tools capable of elucidating critical
recognition of the problematic features of modern capitalist society
and the related consequences that result from how our lives are created
(Postone, 1993; Strydom, 2011).
Critical theory, then, is not a general theory but rather a method of
analysis whose core is immanent critique (Antonio, 1981). To reiterate,
critical theory confronts the twofold task of critique and transformation
via immanent critique, which begins by accounting for its immersion in
history. But critical theory is not merely descriptive; it also seeks to
specify the possibility of qualitative social transformation, which is
necessary if society is to relate to ecosystems in a less ecologically
destructive manner.
3.2. Mediation
A key shortcoming of the ESV criticisms discussed above is their
inability to deal with social mediation. By social mediation we are referring to processes whereby social structure constitutes and is constituted
by human actors (see Postone, 1993: 216–225). The emphasis on social
mediation, which is integral to the methodology of critical theory, is motivated by the recognition that, in modern capitalist society, social relations are constituted in alienated form.2 Although ecological
degradation is a product of human activity, in modern capitalist society,
such activity is conditioned by abstract social forces, which appear to
be beyond human control (Biro, 2005; Vogel, 2011). Agricultural production, as we have argued, is not simply the immediate interaction
among farmers and ecosystems but is strongly mediated through
state agricultural policies (e.g., biofuel blending mandates) that are
themselves constituted in response to a social dynamic (e.g., the
tendency of agriculture to oversupply) that farmers participate in but
do not themselves direct—a process Marx referred to as alienation
[Entfremdung].
For Marx, alienation is the foundation of the entire complex of social
relations under capitalism, and as such it comprises a set of mediating
processes between subject and object. Marx developed his (unﬁnished)
theory of alienation through a critique of G.W.F. Hegel and Adam Smith,
and in the process he identiﬁed and analyzed the intrinsic contradictions constitutive of modern, bourgeois society (Dahms, 2006: 11).
Marx's category of alienation refers to an inherently dynamic set of
social processes, constituted by the capitalist mode of production that,
in addition to estranging humans from nature, self, consciousness, and
others, simultaneously rewrites reality so as to inhibit these very same
humans from consciously recognizing that this estrangement is indeed
the case
One of the advantages of Marxian critical theory over ESV and its
critics lies in its explicit recognition and critique of alienation.
Neo-Marxists, for example, identify ESV with alienation by pointing
out that while technical development appears to be leading to
2
The mediation between humans and ecosystems is a basic property of human labor,
whereby both humans and environment are transformed in the process of meeting a given
end. In modern capitalist society, however, human labor takes a particular form, which
Marx (1978 [1844]) termed alienation (Stoner and Melathopoulos, 2015).
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sustainability, they ultimately give rise to entirely unsustainable
outcomes (see Section 2.2, but also Robertson, 2012). However, we do
not regard this contradiction as proof that ESV is “wrong”. Rather, this
shortcoming is a crucial symptomatic fragment of how ecology and society actually relate in the present and in this moment of reﬂection, how
they could relate differently in the future. The task, therefore, is not one
of ﬂatly opposing ESV. Rather, thought and action must draw on its immediate or superﬁcial appearance so as to press beyond it — to grasp
how seemingly unrelated dimensions of social experience are actually
connected and how apparently related dimensions (e.g. ecosystems
function and ecosystem service value) are deeply mediated through
an alienated social structure.
We suggest Marx's critical theory as a starting point from which interdisciplinary research efforts might begin to address elusive processes
of social mediation. Indeed, the focus on social mediation is an insight
shared by successive generations of critical theorists (e.g., Lukács,
Adorno, Postone) whose work represents the continued relevance of
Marx's theory for analyzing the contemporary world.
Marx's critical theory is also a theory of praxis in that it aims to specify exactly how, through concrete forms of social practice, both subject
and object are produced. “Praxis,” in this sense, refers to the process
whereby forms of social objectivity and social subjectivity are socially
constituted simultaneously. In other words, praxis, as such, can be analyzed and understood only in terms of structures of social mediation
(Postone, 1993: 218, 220). Indeed, it is on this basis that Marx elucidates
the link between epistemology and normative action as being rooted in
the structure of social relations (Postone, 1993: 219). Since the criterion
of validity is social rather than absolute (Postone, 1993: 219), Marx is
able to ground his critique without collapsing into relativism—the
standards of critique are a function of existing social reality. Again, the
dynamism of Marx's theory is grounded in the dynamic and contradictory nature of capital—a historically speciﬁc motion generated from
within the social context of which the theory itself is an integral part.
Marx's theory of mediation therefore offers an important corrective
to the criticisms of ESV discussed above. In contrast to neo-Marxists
who ground their criticism of ESV in an underlying subjectivity that is
veiled or undermined by objectifying the value of ecosystems, the
focus on mediation illuminates such market valuation practices as
socially constituting activity. Market valuation of ecosystems is real, to
be sure. Yet, Marx's focus on mediation, as discussed above, is also
different from those of liberals. Liberal critics are unable to square
their assertion that markets reﬂect society with their attempt to separate a sphere of politics and ethics within which environmental politics
should take place. Such a duality of social life needs to be recognized as
constituted by people through concrete social practices, which are
grasped by the categories (value, etc.) of Marx's critique (Postone,
1993: 220). The pragmatist attempt to generate new mediating practices by foregrounding intersubjective communication (e.g., adaptive
management) ignores the constraints imposed by these categories
and, as such, unwittingly becomes a means of accommodating transformations necessitated by capital.
4. Critique and Transformation
Critique must go beyond simply describing how the shortcomings of
ESV (e.g., by describing how ESV redistributes power and wealth
(neo-Marxists), undermines political activity (liberal) or reinforces
rigid ideologies (pragmatist)). Rather it must press forward to understand the meaning of ESV as an expression of the changing structure
of society itself. Critique would need to understand ESV not as an accidental or irrational feature on an otherwise unproblematic social
whole, but as an expression of what society is and what it could become.
A critique of ESV, in other words, would need to go beyond describing
its effects on society and ecosystems and be able to understand it as
the product of tensions and pressures emerging from this social dynamic.
Insight about the character of this dynamic could then be used to
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theoretically illuminate the kind of social transformation that is in fact
possible.
The ESV criticisms outlined in this paper have been considered in
relation to the question of transformation. Using the methodological
motifs of critical theory discussed above—immanent critique and
mediation—we can discern three features, which are conspicuously absent in recent attempts to ameliorate societally-induced environmental
degradation: 1) a theory of historical dynamics that grasps how ecologically destructive forms of society emerge, transform and reproduce
(against the neo-Marxist claim of the necessity of “resistance”), 2) a political practice that can render this structure increasingly comprehensible from the starting point of current discontents (against the liberal
claim of the identity of politics and markets) and 3) a way of mediating
the relations between thought and these political forms that does not
simply become a hardened ideology (against the pragmatist assertion
that the overcoming of ideology is merely a matter of correct communicative procedure). The expression of these features—absent in the ESV
criticisms discussed above—allows us to identify, albeit very coarsely,
key dimensions of our ecologically destructive form of society as a
necessary precondition for the possibility of transformation beyond the
present form of society. Rather than providing a set of broad prescriptions
for reconciling the antagonism between modern capitalist society and
ecological well-being, these insights need to be understood as a starting
point from which political actors might pursue effective socio-ecological
transformation. Although the speciﬁcs cannot be predetermined at the
outset, such transformation must allow free rational human control
over the ceaseless process of capitalist production that characterizes
modern society, and by extension, the ecosystems we depend upon.
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